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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under the purview of the Utah Constitution, 
Article 1, Section 11. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Is Appellant's denial for demand for counsel in violation of Utah 
Constitution. Article 1. Sections 7. and 11? 
2. Was Appellant denied due process of law when Utah State Department of 
Human Services failed to notice him that his children were receiving welfare assistance 
in violation of Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7 and U.C.A., 63-46b-3 requiring 
notification? 
3. Was Appellant denied due process of law when the lower court failed to act 
upon a Motion for Relief of Judgment pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
60JM? 
4. Can Appellant be incarcerated in an attempt to punish or force him to obtain 
other employment in violation of Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 1, and Article 26, 
Section 3 (3) and, U.C.A., 34-34-1, because his employment is not maiding what the 
Utah Department of Social Services or the Department of Human Services says is 
enough money? 
5. Can U.C.A., 78-45-7.5 (5) fc), U.S.A., 78-45-7.5 (7) be used as the sole basis 
for determining that Mr. Barker is overemployed or underemployed in violation of his 
v 
rights guaranteed pursuant to Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 1, and Article 1, 
Section 25, and U.C.A., 34-34-1? 
6. Can the State of Utah Department of Social Services or the Department of 
Human Services deny Mr. Barker his right to continue in his farming occupation in 
violation of Utah Constitution, Article 12, Section 9 (which was law at the time)? 
7. Can the State of Utah Department of Social Services or the Department of 
Human Services deny Mr. Barker his right to continue in his farming occupation in 
violation of Utah Constitution, Article 3, First? 
8. Can the lower court determine that Mr. Barker is an absconding debtor 
without specific detailed findings by the court which would lead to that conclusion? 
9. Can the lower court determine that Mr. Barker is an absconding debtor 
without sufficient specific facts proving intent to avoid child support payments? 
10. Did the lower court disallow a material change of circumstances without 
specific detailed findings by the lower court which would arrive at that conclusion? 
11. Can U.C.A., 78-45-7.5 (5) fc), 78-45-7.5 (7) (a) and (b) be used to impute 
income to Mr. Barker in violation of his rights guaranteed pursuant to Utah 
Constitution, Article 1, Section 1, Article 1, Section 25, Article 26, Section 3, and 
U.C.A., 34-34-1? 
12. Can Mr. Barker be held to the same standards as an attorney licensed 
with the state of Utah when it results in a loss of his rights and it is not in the interest 
of justice? 
13. Can the lower court "grandfather" Mr. Barker into the new child support 
VI 
guidelines U.C.A., 78-45-7.2 through 78-45-18 in violation of his rights guaranteed 
pursuant to Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 18? 
14. Can the lower court require that Mr, Barker must break the law by 
neglecting his duty to support equally all of his children pursuant to Utah Constitution, 
Article 4, Section 1 ? 
15. Can the lower court determine under U.C.A., 78-45-7.2 (5) that Mr. 
Barker must violate Utah Constitution, Article 4, Section 1, by neglecting his duty to 
support equally al] of his children? 
16. Can the lower court prevent Mr. Barker from honoring a contract with 
his present wife to provide for all of his children equally pursuant to Utah Constitution, 
Article 4, Section 1, in violation of Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 18? 
17. In this civil matter does U.C.A., 78-45-7.2 (5) violate Mr. Barker's rights 
pursuant to Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 21 since he is being involuntarily 
forced to provide a higher standard of living to some of his children to the detriment 
of his other children? 
18. Since Mr. Barker has met the threshold requirement for a material change 
of circumstances should his ex-wife be required to share in child support, if she is able, 
pursuant to U.C.A., 78-45-4? 
19. Do U.C.A., 78-45-3, 78-45-4.1, and 78-45-43, require Mr. Barker to 
provide an unequal support to his non-welfare children in violation of Utah 
Constitution, Article 4, Section 1? 
20. Does U.C.A., 78-45-7.2 (5) require Mr. Barker to provide an unequal 
vn 
support to his non-welfare children in violation of Utah Constitution, Article 4, Section 
1? 
21. Can the lower court reverse a prior lower court finding that Mr. Barker 
is unable to pay child support and that he has purged a contempt charge? 
22. Can the Utah Department of Social Services or the Department of Human 
Services cause a breach of contract between Mr. Barker and his ex-wife by providing 
her and the children with federal reserve notes and then disallow credit for Mr. 
Barker's greater tangible support substance that he has continually provided to them 
since they were married? 
23. Can the Department of Social Services or the Department of Human 
Services hold Mr. Barker solely liable for a contract or instrument signed by his ex-wife 
over whom he has no direction or control pursuant to Uniform Commercial Code 70A-3-
401 or other applicable law? 
24. Can the Department of Social Services or the Department of Human 
Services hold Mr. Barker solely liable for a contract when pursuant to Uniform 
Commercial Code 70A-2-207 or other applicable law notification was given by him 
negating said instrument? 
25. Can the Department of Social Services or the Department of Human 
Services impute to Mr. Barker a contract or instrument signed by his ex-wife over 
whom he has no direction or control and then subrogate that instrument to him? 
pursuant to Uniform Commercial Code 70A-3-401 or other applicable law? 
26. Did Mr. Barker's ex-wife have an interest adverse to him when she 
viii 
voluntarily increased her welfare benefit by selling a home for a fraction of its 
appraised value? 
27. Did Mr. Barker's ex-wife sign a welfare contract in bad faith while she 
was being provided for with substance of a greater value by him in violation of U.C.A., 
62A-11-101? 
28. Did the lower court or the Utah Department of Social Services or the 
Department of Human Services cause Mr. Barker to become involuntarily insolvent 
pursuant to Uniform Commercial Code, 70A-1-203 (23) or other applicable law? 
29. Did the Utah Department of Social Services or the Department of Human 
Services contribute to the increasing debt and subsequent insolvency of Mr. Barker by 
not allowing him credit for substance support "in kind"? 
30. Is there evidence on the record of any notification to Mr. Barker by the 
Utah Department of Human Services that his children were receiving welfare? 
31. Did the Utah Department of Social Services or the Department of Human 
Services fraud Mr. Barker when it held him liable for a contract without giving credit 
for support payments "in kind" since he was given no knowledge or opportunity to 
learn of the contract character or essential terms pursuant to Uniform Commercial 
Code 7QA-3-305 or other applicable law? 
32. Did the Utah Department of Social Services or the Department of Human 
Services loan credit or federal reserve note credit to Mr. Barker's ex-wife in violation 
of Utah Constitution, Article 6, Section 29? 
33. Is Mr. Barker involuntarily insolvent since all of his tangible assets were 
IX 
given to his ex-wife pursuant to Utah Commercial Code 70A-1-201 (23) or other 
applicable law? 
34. Is Mr. Barker's ex-wife required to support her children, if she is able, 
pursuant to U.C.A., 78-45-4? 
35. Did the Utah Department of Social Services or the Department of Human 
Services violate Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 23 and attempt to hold Mr. Barker 
solely liable for a contract or instrument his ex-wife entered into while holding her 
immune? 
36. Can the lower court abuse its discretion by finding Mr. Barker an 
absconding debtor without specific detailed findings on the record from which it arrived 
at that conclusion? 
37. Can the lower court abuse its discretion and determine Mr. Barker is not 
a sovereign, non United States Constitution, 14th Amendment citizen without specific 
detailed findings on the record from which it arrived at that conclusion? 
38. Can the attorneys of record violate Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
11 to the harm of Mr. Barker without sanctions being imposed when demanded? 
39. Can Mr. Barker's ex-wife be considered pro se when the record proves 
that she enjoyed counsel by the Utah Department of Human Services attorney? 
x 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a contempt of court and judgement of Appellant being an 
absconding debtor to avoid child support payments. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the spring of 1984 the Appellant, Mr. Barker and his wife, Laura 
McGillivray, one of the Appellee's, agreed to a Mexican divorce decree. Further 
written and oral agreements were entered into stipulating disposition of property and 
child visitation. Mr. Barker provided Laura with considerable support substance 
including a five bedroom home on 3 acres with water and animal outbuildings, a dairy 
goat herd, several head of sheep, a car, 8 tons of food storage, a great quantity of 
clothing storage for his children which could be used as they got older, and over 300 
dollars per month. 
In January of 1985, Appellee, Laura Signed up for welfare. 
The Utah Department of Social Services would not stop providing assistance to Mr. 
Barkers children when he promptly notified them that the children were being provided 
for. Instead Mr. Barker was in turn notified by the Department that he would have to 
pay more money since no credit would be given for his "payment in kind" ie., the house, 
car, clothes, food, etc. 
Laura moved out of the home after about a 6 months taking all except the animals 
thereby voluntarily increasing her housing costs. She continued to receive over 300 
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dollars every month for five years from Mr. Barker. 
In 1987 a new Utah divorce decree was granted. Laura was awarded custody of the 
couples 4 natural children and her other child who Mr. Barker had adopted. Laura 
was awarded the home that Mr. Barker had provided from funds prior to the couples 
marriage. Laura sold the home for 60% of its appraised value and spent the money 
within 4 months. 
Sometime later Social Services condemned her rented house on the basis that it was 
so filthy that it became a health hazard to the children. The house was fine but the 
housekeeping was not. 
At that time Mr. Barker initiated a modification of custody proceeding. Mr. 
Barker could not afford an attorney at the time and the children were allowed to stay 
with Laura since the judge ruled that the health hazard was hearsay, notwithstanding 
expert testimony from a social service professional who said that it was the worst case 
he had ever seen. 
The children stayed with Mr. Barker for 5 months after he initiated modification 
proceedings since Legal Service attorneys delayed the action that long. Mr. Barker, 
thinking he was obeying the law kept the children to prevent their return to the former 
situation. Three days before the District Court appearance on modification Mr. Barker 
was arrested on custodial interference and arrainged in the 5th Circuit Court of 
Washington County, Utah. 
Mr. Barker did not know how to properly defend himself by bringing evidence 
before the court to prove that he had no intent of breaking the law. He was found 
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guilty on charges that added up to 4 years in jail and a 10,000 dollar fine. The judge 
reduced the sentence with no fine and sentenced him to 2 weeks in jail. 
At that particular time Mr. Barker was in process of completing a contract 
deadline which was the culmination of one year of work. As a result of the 
incarceration the contract was lost and Mr. Barker was not only out of work but in 
considerable debt. 
A short time later a company bought a mining firm that had gone bankrupt for 
which Mr. Barker had formerly worked. Mr. Barker accepted a work contract with 
the new company and worked in that effort for about five months in an attempt to get 
out of debt, which he was for the most part able to do, until they went into a shutdown 
mode. At that time in 1990 due to his declining health, general economic conditions and 
other sundry factors, Mr. Barker started a farming operation. In March of 1991 the 
Utah Department of Social Services initiated its Order to Appear and Show Cause, in 
the 6th Judicial District Court, why he should not go to jail for failing to pay child 
support. Mr. Barker was allowed to purge a contempt charge by the court. Two years 
later the Department of Human Services, without any notification pursuant to law, 
charged him for non support in a different domestic relations district court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Mr. Barker was erroneously found to be an absconding debtor and incarcerated. 
After explaining to the court his legal duty to his current (second) family and children 
Mr. Barker was informed by the court that the first and primary obligation was to pay 
for the welfare debt of the first (welfare) family and that the others were secondary. 
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This action was brought about through the efforts of the State of Utah, 
Department of Human Services utilizing primarily the statutes, or sections thereof, of 
the "Utah Human Services Code", U.C.A., 62a-l-101 and the "Unified Civil Liability 
for Support Act". U.C.A., 78-45-1. 
The second family is clearly being relegated to "second or third class" citizens 
with the first "welfare" family having first call on the financial resources of Mr. Barker. 
In Fact, once a pay order is initially set for the "welfare" family the second or 
subsequent "nonwelfare" family cannot request its rights for equal protection and 
support of their father; i.e., the payments to the "welfare" family can never be adjusted 
downward to meet the growing needs and requirements of the second family. Any 
additional children will forever be relegated to a second rate subservient position to the 
first "welfare" family. 
Through these statutes Mr. Barker and his children have and are being deprived 
of many rights and constitutional guarantees. These statutes must be addressed and 
declared unconstitutional and the rights of Mr. Barker and all of his family 
restored. 
ARGUMENTS OF CASE 
POINT I 
MR. BARKER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
WHEN THE TRIAL COURT DENIED HIS DEMAND 
FOR COUNSEL 
The trial court knowing that Appellant was indigent and a jail sentence was 
about to be imposed in this civil case failed to inform Appellant of his right to counsel. 
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In addition, when Appellant on his own motion demanded counsel it was denied. 
Courts have generally upheld that debtors threatened with body execution in civil 
matters MUST be afforded right to counsel, especially if the court knows they are 
indigent. Robbins v Labar. Transp. Corp. (1984. ND 111) 599 F Supp 705: Wright v 
Crawford, (1966. Ky) 401 SW2d 47: Grimes v Miller. (1977, MP NO 429F Supp 1350. 
The Honorable Judge Tibbs, in 1991 DID PROVIDE APPELLANT WITH 
COUNSEL because a jail sentence of contempt was possible in the civil matter: the 
Honorable Judge Tervort REFUSED COUNSEL TO APPELLANT knowing a iail 
sentence was possible in this matter. 
Mr. Barker has been harmed by an abuse of discretion and the trial court did 
commit error; in that, under Utah Constitution. Article 1. Section 11 Appellant's right 
to defend and right to counsel has been denied. In addition, Mr. Barker has harmed 
by an abuse of discretion and the trial court did commit error when, without counsel 
present, he was held to the same standard as an attorney without having been schooled 
in the law. 
In Hains v Herner, et at 404 U»S. 519 says in part that, 
"however unartfully pleaded, are sufficient to call for the opportunity to 
offer supporting evidence... the pro se compliantant,... we hold to less 
stringent standards than formal pleading's drafted by lawyers." 
The judge stated on the record that he didn't feel the county should have to pay 
for Appellant's legal expenses, knowing that Mr. Barker was indigent, constituting an 
abuse of discretion malicious process, and malicious prosecution. Due process of law 
has been restricted as a result of Appellant not being able to afford an attorney in his 
5 
first appeal by right. 
POINT II 
MR. BARKER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
BY STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
SERVICES WHEN NOT NOTICED HIS CHILDREN 
WERE ON STATE WELFARE. 
Appellant was not given due process of law in violation of Utah Constitution, 
Article 1, Section 7. which says: 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law." 
Mr. Barker was not noticed by the Utah State Department of Human Services 
that his children were on welfare, from 1991 to 1993, or at any other time. 
The Department of Human Services and the Office of Recovery Services have 
violated U.C.A., 63-46b-3 which says: 
"...all adjudicative proceedings shall be commenced by...a notice of 
agency action...."_ 
That agency did not follow administrative due process of law, since Appellant 
was not notified that Appellant's children were receiving public assistance from this 
agency pursuant to U.C.A.. 63-46b~3, and the lower court was told so on the record. 
There is no evidence on the record of any notice. 
Appellant's due process was further hampered by the fact that the Office of 
Recovery Services was in violation of Utah Law. U.C.A., 62A-11-102 (1), says: 
"There is created within the department the Office of Recovery Services 
which has the powers and duties provided by law." 
That law was passed in 1988. Department is defined in U.C.A., 62A-1-1Q4 (1) 
6 
(b), and says: "Department" means the Department of Human Services established in 
1990 pursuant to U.C.A-, 62A-1-102. 
Further evidence of that fact is seen in U.C»A., 62A-1-105 (3) (c), which says, 
"The following offices are created within the Department of Human 
Services: the Office of Recovery Services.", 
wherein the Office of Recovery Services was created within the Utah Department of 
Human Services in 1993. 
In effect the State of Utah Department of Human Services, which was created 
in 1990, created withm itself, in 1988, the Office of Recovery Services. The Department 
could not have created within itself anything if said Department did not exist. In 
otherwords, at the time of this action, there did not exist an Office of Recovery Services 
within the Department presenting absurdity of law. Even colorable law will not tolerate 
absurdity of law. Perhaps that is why appellant never received a notice. 
POINT III 
MR. BARKER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
WHEN THE TRIAL COURT REFUSED AND 
CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO ACT UPON A MOTION 
FOR RELIEF OF JUDGEMENT. 
The Appellant was denied due process of law since a Motion for Relief of Judgment 
and Order pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 fb) was made to the 
lower court and has never been acted upon. Mr. Barker's Response to Objection to 
Defendant's Motion for Relief of Judgment and Order, dated 27 August 1993, further 
clarifies that Motion for Relief but, again, the lower court has refused to view, or 
consider the matter still before it* 
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POINT IV 
MR. BARKER WAS INCARCERATED ON 30 JUNE 1993 
BY THE STATE OF UTAH IN VIOLATION OF UTAH 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS AND 
PRIVILEGES WHICH CONFLICT WITH THE 
UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITIES FOR SUPPORT ACT, 
U.C.A., 78-45 ETSEQ. 
Mr* Barker is being placed in the middle of a Utah Constitutional and statutory 
conflict between U.C.A., 78-45 and U.C.A., 34-34, and other constitutional citations as 
explained below. 
U.C.A.. 78-45-7.5 (5) (c), says: 
"Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether an 
unemployment or overemployment situation exits."; 
U.C.A., 78-45-7.5 (7) (a) says: 
"...finding made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or 
underemployed."; 
and U . C A M 78-45-7.5 (7) fb) savs: 
"...income shall be based upon employment potential and probable 
earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications and 
prevailing earnings for person of similar backgrounds in the community." 
These statutes are in direct conflict and in violation of the Utah Right to Work 
Law, U.C.A., 34-34-1. U.C.A.. 34-34-2. savs: 
"... and further, that the right to live includes the right to work. The 
exercise of the right to work must be protected and maintained free from 
undue restraints and coercion." 
U.C.A., 34-34-6 mandates that: 
"...any other type of association engaging in..., or other conduct, a 
purpose of which is to compel or force any other person, ...to violate any 
provision of this chapter shall be quilty of illegal conduct contrary to 
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public policy...." 
The court is illegally, through U.C.A., 78-45 "guidelines", attempting to force 
appellant into obtaining other employment simply because his farming occupation, at 
this point in time, 1) is not making what the State of Utah says is enough money; 2) not 
what the State of Utah, Department of Human Services deems appropriate for 
Appellant's past formal education; and 3) is coercing him from occupational change 
based on necessity. The State of Utah is by the very definition coercing and preventing 
Appellant from exercising "the right to work" free of "undue restraints and coercion" 
and is direct violation of U.C.A., 34-34-6. 
The State of Utah is not barred from obtaining their support payments, inasmuch 
as the statutes provide for liens against obligers and obligor estates, so to preclude an 
individual of the right to work is clearly a violation of basic rights-
Incarceration to coerce Appellant to obtain other employment as defined by the State 
of Utah with an income defined by the State of Utah is in violation of his Utah 
Constitution, Article 26, Section 3 (3), which says: 
"The legislature shall prohibit: ...(3) The political and commercial control 
of employees." 
The State of Utah is trying to politically and commercially control Appellant's 
labor; forcing him to obtain other employment by putting him in jail, which could result 
in the ruin of Appellant's farming business. 
If, for any reason, the State of Utah, Department of Human Services can declare 
Mr. Barker "underemployed" or "overeraployed" it is a natural extrapolation that the 
State of Utah WILL NEXT ATTEMPT to decide if Mr. Barker must change his 
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occupation, the salary at which he may work, and even the location of his employment. 
This deprives Mr. Barker of inalienable rights to decide what is best for his 
personal and family requirements hi violation of Utah Constitution. Article 1. Section 
25, which says: 
"This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny 
others retained by the people." 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE STATE OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICE HAS VIOLATED 
MR. BARKER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO WORK 
Appellant's Right To Work under U.C.A.. 34-344 has been violated. U.C.A.. 
34-34-2. says: 
"... and further, that the right to live includes the right to work. The 
exercise of the right to work must be protected and maintained free from 
undue restraints and coercion." 
Imputation of income and incarceration to force appellant to obtain other work 
of a higher pay which is not available is against the law. Under Utah Constitution. 
Article 1. Section 1: 
"All men have the INHERENT and INALIENABLE RIGHT to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect their 
property...." (emphasis added). 
The right to life includes the right to work and Appellant's inherent right to life 
has been deprived. Under Utah Constitution. Article 1. Section 4. Appellant's right 
to conscience has been denied. Under Utah Constitution. Article 12. Section 9. which 
at the time had not been repealed, Appellant's right, which says: 
"Each person in Utah is free to obtain and enjoy employment whenever 
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possible, and a person or corporation, or their agent, servant, or 
employee may not maliciously interfere with any person from obtaining 
employment or enjoying employment already obtained from any other 
person or corporation.", 
has been violated. Mr. Barker had been working at an egg production business long 
before the lower court brought action against him in 1991. 
Under Utah Constitution. Article 3, First, perfect toleration of religious liberty right 
has been violated. This article says: 
M
.,.no inhabitant of this state shall ever be molested in person or property 
on account of his or her mode of religious worship...." 
Appellant has maintained the belief for years that the federal social security 
number is the mark of the "beast" as spoken of in The Book of Revelations in the Holy 
Bible. Appellant has not used that number for many years, nor is there any law 
requiring him to do so. The court, however, is illegally attempting to force him into a 
social insurance contract by putting him in jail. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE SPECIFIC 
FINDINGS OF FACT IN SUPPORT OF ITS 
CONCLUSION THAT MR. BARKER WAS AN 
ABSCONDING DEBTOR 
Utah Constitution. Article 1, Section 16, says: 
"There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of absconding 
debtors." 
Appellant is not an absconding debtor! Several years ago a contract work agreement 
expired due to a corporate shutdown and Appellant was involuntarily unemployed, as 
shown by the record. In light of general economic conditions; i.e., 1500 applications for 
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one job in the area, projected future conditions for highly specialized mining, a 
declining health situation, religious belief along with a work ethic, a need to feed his 
family and to keep them off of welfare, Appellant became involved in farming. 
Appellant has been farming for over 4 years. Furthermore, there is absolutely no 
evidence that he was underemployed for the purpose of avoiding a support obligation. 
Certainly Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 406, which says that: 
"operation was in conformity to habit or routine practice.", 
applies to Mr. Barker's established egg business which had been ongoing for over a 
year. 
The court attempted to "grandfather" Appellant into application of guidelines 
after 1989 pursuant U.C.A., 78-45-7.2. 
It is apparent the only determinate used by the trial court to declare Appellant an 
absconding debtor was the post 1989 law application of U.C.A., 78-45-7.5 (5) (c) which 
says: 
"Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether an 
underemployment or overemployment situation exists." 
The Attorneys for the Utah Department of Human Services and the Appellee 
failed to provide any offer of proof pursuant to Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103 that 
work was available in the area. 
In violation of fundamental constitutional rights stated above, the lower court, 
without considering all the facts, arbitrarily and with abuse of discretion and abuse of 
process made a finding that appellant was intentionally underemployed to avoid support 
payments, when in fact that is not so. Also, Appellant's farm business must be 
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considered pursuant to U.C.A., 78-45-7.5 (4) (a), which in affect says: 
"...the income and expenses from self employment or operation of a 
business shall be reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross 
income available to the parent to satisfy a child support award..*.1' 
In today's worsening economic conditions people must often obtain lesser 
employment in order to survive. The judge ignored the facts and with abuse of 
discretion falsely imprisoned appellant. 
Findings are adequate only if they are: 
"sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusions on each factual issue was reached 
." Stevens v. Stevens. 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah Ct. App.1988) (quoting 
Action v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987): Ostler v. Ostler. 789 
P.2d 713 (Utah Ct.App 1990). 
The court did not include all relevant factors outlined in U.C.A., 78-45-7 (2), and 
U.C.A., 78-45-7 (3), i.e., responsibility of Appellant for others, in arriving at its 
conclusion; nor did it consider other relevant factors such as health, general economic 
conditions etc. 
Can the court determine that appellant is intentionally underemployed when it 
is impossible to obtain work in the area which is of a like nature and at the same rate 
of pay? Rather than the judge ruling that a past work contract was in fact an unusual 
one of a kind overemployment situation, he ruled arbitrarily that appellant was 
underemployed with intent to avoid child support payments. Appellant told the judge, 
on the record, that he was not intentionally trying to avoid child support payments, but, 
without any evidence, with prejudice, and with abuse of discretion he ruled to the 
contrary. Findings of the court were not sufficiently detailed and did not include 
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enough subsidiary facts to disclose the ultimate conclusion of underemployment to avoid 
child support. 
"Findings of fact should be sufficiently detailed and include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusions on 
each factual issue was reached." Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P»2d 1336,1338 
(Utah 1979). 
The trial court failed to make findings on all material issues since, the facts on 
record are not clear and uncontroverted. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P»2d 909 (Utah App. 
1988) 
It should have been obvious to Judge Tervort that Appellant was not an 
absconding debtor since the record shows that Mr. Barker offered to pay when he was 
able, and Appellant has been openly pursuing a farming occupation for a number of 
years and has experienced major setbacks. 
POINT VII 
STATE OF UTAH ABUSED DISCRETION AND 
COMMITTED ERROR IN COMPUTING OR IMPUTING 
INCOME TO MR. BARKER AND NOT ALLOWING A 
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
U.C.A., 78-45-7.5 (7) (a).which says: 
"Income may not be imputed to a person unless the parent stipulates to 
the amount imputed and a hearing is held or a finding made that the 
parent is VOLUNTARILY unemployed or underemployed." (emphasis 
added) 
Nor can the state "impute" income to the obligor and harm the individual and 
his new family in violation Utah statutes or his or her basic right to wed and honor a 
contract to support a new family, simply because an involuntary underemployment 
situation exists, when there is no intent to defraud. 
14 
The state is not precluded from obtaining child support provided by the state 
since, under the law of equity, the obligee is under the same duty of support to the 
children, U.C.A., 78-45-4. 
The judge should not have overlooked Appellant's change of circumstances since 
Appellant was farming for about 4 years and is supporting a new family with six 
dependents; and it is certain that Appellant does not have the money, at this time, to 
be able to pay 600 dollars per month for child support. U.C.A., 78-45-7.5 (7) (b), 
which says: 
"If income is imputed to a parent the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work 
history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of 
similar background in the community.", 
should not have been applied to Mr. Barker since a change of circumstances did, in 
fact, occur and he INVOLUNTARILY lost work contracts. No other factors and 
specific detailed findings which effected Mr. Barker's income were considered to 
properly arrive at a conclusion that he is "voluntarily underemployed" with the sole 
purpose and intent to avoid a child support obligation. 
Moreover, there is nothing on the record which would overcome the fact that a 
highly specialized overemployment work contract had expired due to a corporate 
shutdown and that work of a like nature, simply, did not exist in the state of Utah. Mr. 
Barker is being punished for a bad Utah economy over which he has no control. 
Appellant told the court that he looked for other mining work and that no similar 
work was available. Rather than go on welfare, unemployment, or disability, appellant 
sought to prudently obtain other employment. 
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It is also proper to consider obligation incurred since the divorce to support a 
"new family" including a step-child. In Wright v. Wright Utah P.2d 443 (1978) the 
Utah Supreme Court held that: 
"the undertaking to support stepchildren does not relieve the parent of his 
obligation to support his own natural." 
Thereafter, in 1979, the legislature enacted U.C.A., 78-45-4.1 which provides as 
follows: 
"A step-parent shall support a step-child to the same extent that a natural 
or adoptive parent is required to support a child...." 
Although the obligation to support a second family does not replace the obligation 
to support one's natural children, it is certainly a factor to be considered maldng a 
modification of a divorce decree. 
The lower court ignored the fact that the threshold requirement had been met for 
a material change of circumstances, (notwithstanding that the attorney for the state of 
Utah admitted on the record that the requirement had been met). In disregard of 
U.C.A., 78-45-7, which allows for a change of circumstances, the judge ruled on the 
amount of support owing pursuant to the "guidelines". Is not the judge prevented from 
practicing law on the bench by the Utah Constitution? 
The court and the Department of Human Services is trying to "grandfather" 
appellant in under new U.C.A., 78-45-7.2 through U.C.A., 78-45-18. "guidelines" in 
violation of basic rights in this civil matter. Income was imputed to appellant by the 
lower court using the "guidelines" in U.C.A., 78-45-7.5 (7) (b) based on voluntary 
underemployment; but the court then determined, on the record, that the support 
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amount would be the same as that determined by prior court order pursuant to U.C.A., 
78-45-7. 
Mr. Barker was harmed since he apparently did not artfully plead evidence to rebut 
the "guidelines". In the interest of justice, all factors in the instant matter should be 
considered by the lower court and Mr. Barker should not be held to the same standards 
as an attorney. 
The court ignored evidence that use of the "guidelines" would be unjust, inappropriate, 
and not in the best interest of all of appellant's children, and the taxpayers of the state 
of Utah. 
POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE SPECIFIC 
FINDINGS OF FACT IN SUPPORT OF ITS 
CONCLUSION ON CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION 
The court arrived at its conclusion about Appellant's child support obligation 
without having made specific detailed findings in reaching its conclusion on the record. 
Mr. Barker should not have been held to the same standards as an attorney in 
presenting to the court his change of circumstances which would aUow a rebuttal of the 
"guidelines". The attorney for the Utah Department of Human Services said, on the 
record, that the requirement for a change of circumstances had been met. The court 
did not consider that application of the guidelines pursuant to U.C.A., 78-45-7.2 (3) 
would cause Mr. Barker, an injustice, that it was not in the best interest of several of 
his children, and it was inappropriate. 
It was and is inappropriate to apply the guidelines since said statute conflicts 
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with the Utah Constitution, Utah Statutes, and prior Utah Supreme Court rulings. 
U.C.A., 78-45-7.2 (5) says: 
"In a proceeding to modify an existing award, a consideration of natural 
or adoptive children other than those in common to both parties may be 
applied to mitigate an increase in the award, but may not be applied to 
justify a decrease in the award." 
This statute places Appellant's children of his new family secondary, in their 
support privilege, to those children on welfare. This statute violates Mr. Barker's Utah 
Constitution, Article f, Section 1 which says: 
"All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their 
lives and liberties...." 
Mr. Barker is precluded from enjoying this constitutional right since he is unable 
to provide equal support for his new family and children to the same extent that would 
be the case if all the children were equally provided for under the same roof. 
This statute violates Mr. Barker's Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 18 which 
says: 
"No bill of attainder expost facto law, or law impairing the obligation of 
contracts shall be passed." 
The statute violates this constitutional provision and is morally repugnant since 
Mr. Barker is being forced to provide for his welfare children at a fixed rate of money 
in a period of personal and general economic decline while his new family must go 
without. Mr. Barker has a right to contractually wed and support his new family. 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 21 says: 
"Neither slavery or involuntary servitude, except as punishment for a 
crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within 
this State." 
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United States Constitution, 13th Amendment guarantees the same right. 
U.C.A., 78-45-7.2 (5) places appellant in involuntary servitude to the benefit of 
the welfare children but to the detriment of the non-welfare children, being precluded 
by his circumstances from providing equal support to all Appellant's children at his 
given level of income. For example, if Mr. Barker were not divorced he would have the 
right to voluntarily obtain lessor employment and reduce the standard of living for his 
entire family. However, now that Mr. Barker is divorced and must pay child support 
to Department of Human Services he is prevented in his right to do so. 
Moreover, Appellant is required by the lower court to provide a total support 
obligation to the welfare children to a greater extent than the children of his new family 
due to his present financial circumstances which do in fact meet the requirements for 
a change of circumstances. 
The welfare children are enjoying a greater standard of living than they enjoyed 
while being under the control of appellant, even though child support awards should 
approximate actual need and, when possible, assure the children a standard of living 
comparable to that which they would have experienced if no divorce had occurred. 
Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713: 131 Utah Adv.Rep. 15, (Ut.Ct.App. 03/13/90) 
U.C.A., 78-45-7 (3) (1990) states: 
"(3) ...The court shall establish support after considering all relevant 
factors, including but not limited to: 
a) The standard of living and situation of the parties; 
b) The relative wealth and income of the parties; 
c) The ability of the obligor to earn; 
d) The ability of the obligee to earn; 
e) The need of the obligee; 
f) The age of the parties; 
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g) The responsibility of the obligor for the support of others*" 
The courts have recognized that: 
"[s]eetion 78-45-7 REQUIRES the trial court to consider AT LEAST the 
seven factors listed..,[and to] enter findings on ALL of the factors." 
Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 911 (Utah App. 1988) (emphasis added). 
The judge did not consider these criteria, from U.C.A., 78-45-7, to Appellant or 
Appellee in reaching a judgment, nor did he consider other relevant matters such as, 
present state of health of the parties, or that Appellee did voluntarily increase her 
house payment by selling in essence a paid for home to the harm of Mr. Barker. 
The record will show that Appellee testified that her health was good, she was 
able to work, she had received several years of college education through welfare monies 
and had considerable work experience. 
The lower court did not consider the above in light of the said statutes and did 
error and abuse is discretion to the harm of Appellant.There are no specific findings as 
to why they were not considered, even though pursuant to Woodward v. Wood word, 
709P.2d393 (Utah 1985), they should have been. 
The judge did not consider that pursuant to U.C.A., 78-45-4 that Appellee has a 
duty of support for her children. No specific finding was made as to why she should 
not share in the support obligation since, the record shows that she is able to work, and 
has received about 2 years training from welfare in addition to prior college training. 
Nor did he consider that she might be uxtentionally underemployed hi light of the fact 
that she has had considerable work experience at below "minimum wage", and that she 
sold a home which was almost paid for which has in effect made her more mtentionaliy 
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welfare dependant at a higher level of welfare income. The trial court failed to make 
findings on all material issues since, the facts on record are not clear and 
uneontroverted. Jefferies v. Jefferies. 752 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1988) 
The court did abuse its' discretion and committed error in computing gross 
income for support purposes, for some of Mr. Barker's children while excluding his 
other children living with him, by negating U.C.A.. 78-45-3: 
"Every father shall support his child", 
U.C.A., 78-45-4.1 says: 
"A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the same extent that a natural 
or adoptive parent is required to support a child....", 
and U.C.A., 78-45-4.3 savs: 
"Nothing contained herein shall act to relieve the natural parent or 
adoptive parent of the primary obligation of support...." 
The trial court's conclusions of law do not agree with said statutes. 
The court apparently does not understand that a parent has the PRIMARY duty to 
support his NATURAL AND HIS STEPCHILDREN (U.C. A., 78-45-4.1). If his children 
become wards of the state he is not relieved of the above stated primary obligation of 
support (U.C.A., 78-45-4.3), In otherwords, a parent has the primary obligation of 
support for all his children and is not relieved of the obligation simply because one 
group of children are on welfare. 
The statutes do not say that a parents' obligation to his natural and 
stepchildren is SECONDARY. Nor can the State of Utah force Mr. Barker to breech 
a contract made with his second wife. If that were so, a parent could legally let his 
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non-welfare children starve since, as it would be legally reasoned, the welfare children 
are the PRIMARY. Moreover that would violate the Utah Constitution, Article 1, 
Section 7 right of Mr. Barker's new family, which right says: 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law." 
The lower court cannot require that Mr. Barker violate the law by causing him 
to take away the right of parental support of some of his children to the exclusion of 
others. Nor can the lower court require Mr. Barker to violate the law by requiring him 
to provide an equal protection right to some of his children and deny the same right to 
the others pursuant to Utah Constitution, Article 4, Section 1% which says: 
"...Both male and female citizens of this State shall enjoy equally all civil, 
political and religious rights and privileges." 
"To fail to give effect to all provisions of a statute, or give a statute 
unreasonable or absurd construction, violates fundamental rules of 
statutory interpretation." Sherwood v Elgart 63 ALR 2D 490. 
U.C.A., 78-45-7.2 (5) says: 
"In a proceeding to modify an existing award, consideration of natural or 
adoptive children other than those in common to both parties may be 
applied to mitigate an increase in the award, but may not be applied to 
justify a decrease in the award." 
That statute places Mr. Barker in violation of the aforementioned laws since a 
limited change of circumstances under this section would cause him to relegate his other 
natural children to third class citizens, and would force him to violate Utah Statutes, 
force him to deny his new family equal protection under the law, and would deny him 
various aforementioned substantive rights. 
In addition, this would give the state the power to relegate certain classes 
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(non-welfare children) to third class citizens. The law will not tolerate such an 
absurdity. This cannot be in any way construed to be legislative intent! 
"Every father must support his child", (ILCA., 78-45-3). 
An "obligor" is any person owing a duty of support (U.C.A., 78-45-2 (9)). The 
trial court said in it's Conclusions of Law dated 16 July 1993, however: "Defendant's 
obligation to support his natural children of this action, is primary to his obligation to 
support his natural children of subsequent common law marriage or stepchildren of the 
same common law marriage". And "While the Defendant may have an obligation to 
support stepchildren of a common law marriage, that obligation is secondary to his 
support obligation to his natural children." 
The statutes simply do not and cannot be construed in such a manner to affirm 
the courts' conclusion. In fact of law the Utah Supreme Court has ruled in Openshaw 
v Qpenshaw, 639 P2d 177, that it constitutes a factor in a material change of 
circumstances, and the lower court has abused its' discretion in disallowing a material 
change of circumstances. 
Support of children must consider husband's ability to meet reasonable needs of (all) 
children. Callister v. Callister, 261 P2d, 944. 
In this instance principles of law have been arbitrarily misconstrued and misapplied. 
The judge did abuse his discretion. 
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POINT IX 
THE TRIAL COURT REVERSED A PRIOR DISTRICT 
COURT JUDGEMENT ALLOWING PURGING OF 
CONTEMPT 
The court abused its discretion and did err when it reversed judgement of a prior 
district court verdict in violation of Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 16, which 
says: "There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in the case of absconding 
debtors" and in violation of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 (b) which says: "(6) 
the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon 
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable 
that the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment." 
The record minute entry for the Honorable Judge Tibbs, Fifth Judicial District 
Court, for 12 March 1991 on page 5 says: 
"Jail susp. & Def. may purge this if he files a list of all his income & 
expenses...for 6 months." 
In otherwords, Appellant was told that if a six months account of the farming operation 
was provided to the court that the contempt charge would be purged. Appellant did as 
required by the court and heard nothing further. 
In a different court two years later Judge Tervort did, at the beginning of the 
this action, ask Mr. Barker if he had given the accounting to the prior court. Mr. 
Barker replied in the affirmative. Judge Tervort stated on the record: "Well, that takes 
care of that.", indicating that the contempt charge had been dropped. The court 
reporter, Joseph Lidell was repeatedly asked for the Law and Motion day transcript of 
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that statement by Mr. Barker but it has not been forthcoming. Mr. LideD was first 
asked for it by Mr. Barker on the telephone immediately after Appellant's mcarceration 
and in later letters requesting it but to no avail. 
Judge Tervort did in a final Judgment and Order dated 3 August 1993, paragraph 
4, state: 
"All other prior orders and judgments in this matter shall remain in full 
force and effect." 
Therefore, not only is Judge Tervort attempting to reverse a prior order, he has 
also in his final Order affirmed the prior Judgment and Order of Judge Tibb's court. 
Under ordinary circumstances it is improper for a judge to reverse an order of 
his colleague. Peterson v. Peterson, 530 P.2d 821 (Utah 1974). The court did abuse its 
discretion and committed error when it reversed a prior district court order. 
POINT X 
STATE OF UTAH ATTEMPTING ILLEGAL 
SUBROGATION OF WELFARE CONTRACT 
The State of Utah Department of Human Services is, with threat, duress, 
coercion, and imprisonment trying to force upon Appellant into a quasi state- federal 
social contract while holding Appellee immune, in violation of Utah Constitution, 
Article 1, Section 18 and U.C.A., 78-45-4. Section 18 says: 
"No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation 
of contracts shall be passed". 
U.C.A., 78-45-4 says: 
"Every woman shall support her child...." 
The constitutional law existed before other current Utah laws: laws that are 
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attempting to force appellant to break his current contract to support his new family 
and children equally and force him into other contracts. Appellant did not contract 
with Utah Department of Social Services, or Utah Department of Human Services. 
Appellant did not sign a contract pursuant to applicable law or Uniform Commercial 
Code, 70A-3-40I which says: 
"(1) A Person is not liable on an instrument unless: (a) the person signed 
the instrument....", 
or other applicable law. Appellant noticed Department of Social Services pursuant to 
applicable law and Uniform Commercial Code, 70A-2-207, which says: 
"(2) (c) Notification of objection to them has already been given or is 
given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received." 
They were told to stop paying federal reserve notes to his family since the family was 
being supported. In fact, the record shows that timely notification was given the Office 
of Recovery Services indicating Appellant was providing a home, car, food, clothing, 
and over 300 dollars per month in addition to numerous other substantive support 
payments in land. In other words, the Office of Recovery Services was originally 
notified in February 1985 that Appellant was providing adequate support to his family 
and to terminate any welfare assistance. Notwithstanding, the Office of Recovery 
Services continued to alienate the affections of Mr. Barker's family from him and to 
cause a breech of contract between him and his former wife by providing federal 
reserve notes to said family. The Office of Recovery Services then claimed that all of 
the substance that Mr. Barker provided, as noted above, was not allowable since it was 
payment in kind. (See Appellant's Notice to Department of Social Services Exhibit dated 
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February, 1985) Moreover, at no time has Appellant failed to demand an explicit 
reservation of rights and remedies pursuant to applicable law or Uniform Commercial 
Code, 70A-1-207 which says: 
"(1) A party who with explicit reservations of rights performs or promises 
performance or assents to performance in a manner demanded or offered 
by the other party does not thereby prejudice the rights reserved...." 
In addition, the State of Utah Department of Human Services and respondent, 
Laura Beth McGillivray are illegally and improperly attempting to subrogate 
respondent's welfare debt by imputing the debt to appellant. It is well established that 
the basis for legal imputation is the "Primary's" (appellant's) control over and ability 
to direct the "Agent" (appellee). If the primary does not legally control and direct the 
agent there can be no imputing, hence no legal subrogation. It is obvious that Appellant 
has no control over any actions of Appellee including her fraudulent actions or 
fraudulent action of the Utah Department of Social Services and the Department of 
Human Services. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines IMPUTES as follows: 
"As used in legal phrases, this word means attributed vicariously; that is, 
an act, fact, or quality is said to be "imputed" to a person when it is 
ascribed or charged to him, not because he is personally cognizant of it 
or responsible for it, but because another person is, over whom he has 
control for acts or knowledge he is responsible." (Emphasis added) 
The doctrine of "Imputed Negligence" IS LIMITED TO CASES where there is 
a right to control in the relationship of a master and servant, principal and agent or a 
joint enterprise. Claugh v. Schurtz 48 A.2d 92L922, 94 N.H. 138. 
The rule that the agent's knowledge regarding business conducted by him 
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affecting principal is "imputed" to principal DOES NOT APPLY if in the particular 
transaction involved the agent has a interest which is adverse to the principal. Haep v. 
Bank of Arizona 110 P.2d 235, 237. 57 Ariz. 8. 
It is well settled that subrogation on behalf of surety is never applied against an 
innocent person wronged by the principal's fraud. 
U.S.Fidelitv & Guaranty Co. v. First Nat. Bank in Dallas. C.A.Tex, 172 F.2d 258: 
American Suritv Co. of New York V. Lewis State Bank, C.C.A.FLA., 58 F.2d 559. 
"His liability for necessaries provided by other persons for her support rests entirely 
upon the ground of his neglect or default." 
The record will show that Appellee was awarded a home and land valued at 25,060 
dollars, that Mr. Barker had secured to himself prior to this marriage, for the support 
of the ehUdren but that she immediately sold it for 15,000 dollars, spent the money 
within a few months, and thereby voluntarily increased her housing cost significantly 
to the harm of Appellant. Appellee and the Utah Department of Social Services and the 
Department of Human Services, to the harm of Appellant, are attempting to collect a 
welfare debt which is significantly higher due to increased housing costs. There does 
not exist the element of "good faith" in the above supposed contract under the 
provisions of applicable law or Uniform Commercial Code, 70A-1-203, which says: 
"Every contract or duty within this act imposes an obligation of good faith 
in its performance or enforcement." 
Appellee continued receiving and enjoying payment in kind from Appellant, i.e., a 
house, over 8 tons of food storage, clothing, a car, etc., and over 300 dollars per month 
for a period of 5 years while at the same time was receiving welfare assistance. Utah 
Department of Social Services did not allow Appellant credit for payment "in land" 
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while continuing to loan Appellee mere federal reserve note credit instead of value or 
substance. 
Appellee was in violation of U.C.A., 62A-11-101 which says: "It is the intent of 
the Legislature that the integrity of the public assistance programs of this state be 
maintained and that the taxpayers support only those persons in need and only as a 
resource of last resort. To this end, this part should be liberally construed.", 
since she did "double dip" and did not really have to go on welfare. 
Further, by disallowing Appellant's payment "in kind" and requiring him to 
repay said welfare assistance in federal reserve notes it caused him to become 
involuntarily insolvent as defined by applicable law and Uniform Commercial Code, 
70A-1-201 (23). which says: 
"A person is 'insolvent9 who either ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary 
course of business or cannot pay his debts as they become due or if he is 
insolvent within the meaning of the federal bankruptcy law." 
By not allowing payment "in kind" which Appellant and Appellee had contracted 
to do, and was acted upon by both for a number of years, the Department of Social 
Services and now the Department of Human Services have fraudulently misrepresented 
the facts pursuant to applicable law and Uniform Commercial Code* 70A-3-3Q5, which 
precludes the enforcement of the welfare contract based on: 
(1) (a) (ii) "duress, lack of legal capacity, or illegality of the transaction 
which, under other law nullifies the obligation of the obligor;" 
(iii) "fraud that induced the obligor to sign the instrument with neither 
knowledge or reasonable opportunity to learn of its character or its 
essential terms; or" 
(iv) "discharge of the obligor in insolvency proceeding;" 
Appellant is harmed since, said Departments have not even under colorable law 
given welfare assistance credit for value or "payment in kind" taken or disallowed. 
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Utah Department of Social Services and Department of Human Services by 
providing welfare assistance in the form of federal reserve note credit and having done 
so to the harm of Appellant have violated provisions of Utah Constitution. Article 6. 
Section 29. which precludes lending public credit to a private individual. 
The foregoing coercion, misrepresentation, and fraud, which should be estopped, 
have placed Appellant in a condition of involuntary insolvency pursuant to Uniform 
Commercial Code. 70A-1-2Q1 (23). or other applicable law, and he is unable to pay his 
debts hi the ordinary course of business as evidenced by United States Code. Title 31. 
Section 5118 (b) and United States Code. Title 31. Section 5119 fa). 
Pursuant to United States Code. Title 12. Section 411. federal reserve notes are 
treasury obligations. Under United States Code. Title 31. Section 314. United States 
Code. Title 31. Section 821. and United States Code. Title 31. Section 822. "United 
States money is expressed in dollars." 
Since there is no silver of a specified purity as defined by congress in the federal 
reserve note it is not a dollar. The term dollar is fraudulently engraved on the federal 
reserve note. The lower court has attempted to place Appellant in a condition of 
involuntary servitude which is forbidden by Utah Constitution. Article 1. Section 21. 
which says: 
"Neither slavery or involuntary servitude, except as punishment for a 
crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within 
this State." 
The lower court having incarcerated Appellant because he cannot pay federal 
reserve notes, after having taken away all of his substantive assets, has harmed Mr. 
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Barker. Moreover, the Utah Department of Human Services has frauded, 
misrepresented, or otherwise not fully disclosed the nature of an agreement entered into 
by Appellee and are trying to force said agreement or instrument upon Mr. Barker. 
Moreover, because Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 24, requires a uniform 
operation of the law, and under the laws of equity, law merchant, or other applicable 
law or principles of law including, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, 
misrepresentation, duress, coercion, Appellee is, pursuant to U.C»A., 78-45-4, required 
to support her children. She then, cannot become immune from her contract by 
subrogating a debt that she contracted for, to the harm of another. 
The lower court was notified in Appellant's Affidavit dated 9 July 1993 that he 
explicitly reserved his rights and remedies under Uniform Commercial Code, 7QA-1-207, 
or other applicable law. 
POINT XI 
APPELLEE NOT IMMUNE FROM WELFARE 
CONTRACT 
The State of Utah, Department of Social Services and Department of 
Human Services have violated Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 23 which says: 
"No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, privilege or 
immunity." 
They are attempting to make Appellant solely liable for a child support contract 
that Appellee signed and entered into, while holding Appellee to be privileged and 
immune from said contract. At no time has Appellant voluntarily entered into a 
contract with any department for said services. 
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Appellee, Laura Beth McGillivray, is liable and not immune for the instrument, 
as she signed it with the State of Utah, Department of Social Services, pursuant to 
applicable law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 70A-3-401 which says: A person is 
liable if: 
"(1) (a) the person signed the instrument...." 
Appellee accepted that agreement by continuing to be a welfare recipient under 
applicable law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 70A-2-208 which says: 
"(1) Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for 
performance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the 
performance and opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course 
of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be 
relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement." 
U.C.A., 78-45-4 says: 
"Every woman shall support her child...." 
Appellee cannot assign away the duty to support them. Nor can the State of 
Utah, Department of Human Services relieve or render Appellee immune from the 
obligation if in fact she even signed a contract with them. There is no evidence on the 
record that Appellee even entered a contract with that agency. 
Nor can the State of Utah Department of Social Services, or the Department of 
Human Services legally loan its' federal reserve note credit or other credit in aid of 
Appellee, who is a private individual, in violation of Utah Constitution, Article 6, 
Section 29 which says: 
"The legislature shall not authorize the State, or any county, city town, 
township, district or other political subdivision of the State to lend its 
credit...in aid of any...other private individual or corporate enterprise or 
undertaking." 
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Nor can the State of Utah Department of Social Services, or Department of 
Human Services loan monies for welfare unless said monies are obtained from loans 
specifically for that purpose pursuant to Utah Constitution, Article 14, Section 1 which 
says: "To meet casual deficits or failures in revenue, and for 
necessary expenditures for public purposes*..and for the 
payment of all Territorial indebtedness assumed by the 
state, the State may contract debts...and all monies arising 
from loans herein authorized, shall be applied solely to the 
purpose for which they were obtained." 
The aforementioned Departments have not only harmed Appellant by a violation 
of those laws but have harmed the general citizenry of the entire State of Utah. 
Inasmuch as the element of fraud on the part of Appellee has been evidenced on the 
record in Judge Tibb's court in 1991, as evidenced by the statement of attorney 
Gammon for the Utah Department of Social Services wherein he declared to the Judge 
that "It looks like we have a case of welfare fraud", along with the use of welfare which 
was not obtained as a means "of last resort" as discussed in Point X above, Appellee 
should not be held immune from her contracts with the Utah Department of Social 
Services and the Department of Human Services. 
POINT XII 
APPELLANT UNABLE AND MAY NOT BE LIABLE TO 
PAY WELFARE MONIES 
The court has by putting Appellant in jail, prevented him from a duty of support 
for Appellant's current family which is in violation of U»C.AM 78-45-4.1 and U.C»A., 
78-45-3., since he is not intentionally underemployed to avoid support payments. 
Appellant simply does not have the money at this time nor is it available to him. 
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This cannot be construed to mean, nor should any attempt be made to attach any 
implication, that appellant is attempting to avoid child support payments. 
The court has by putting him in jail, prevented him from his primary duty of 
support, i.e., providing for Appellant's his new family consisting of a wife and 5 
children. If appellant is not able to recover from the damage done to his family, or if 
he is prevented from providing primary support to them, it will result in 6 people going 
on welfare. A colloquial "catch 22" situation. The intent to be "liberally construed", 
ofU.C.A., 62A~lf-302is 
"... to the end that children shall be maintained from the resources of 
responsible parents, thereby relieving or avoiding, at least in part, the 
burden often borne by the general citizenry through public assistance 
programs." 
By placing Appellant in jail and preventing him from providing his duty 
of support to his immediate family, the court has violated his Utah Constitution, Article 
In Section 1, right to enjoy and defend his life and liberty, and to protect property. 
When the court fails to enter adequate findings on each relevant factor, it is 
REVERSIBLE ERROR unless the undisputed evidence clearly establishes the factor or 
factors on which the findings are missing. Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 715 (Utah Ct.App. 
1988). 
Findings are adequate only if they are 
"sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate conclusions on each factual issue was reached ." Stevens v. Stevens, 754 
P.2d 952, 958 (Utah Ct. App.1988) (quoting Action v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 
1987) 
Utah statutes draw no distinction in terms of support duty between custodial and 
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non-custodial parents nor between fathers and mothers. The duty of both is the same; 
"Every man shall support his child...," U.C.A., 78-45-3; "Every woman 
shall support her child..." U.C.A., 78-45-4. 
In a court appearance in 1991 Appellant tendered an offer for alleged support 
debt owing even though it would impose on him an extreme and unreasonable hardship. 
He tried to stipulate that half of what he earned he would apply to his child support 
obligation. Judge Tibb's tried to encourage all parties to stipulate to that since it was 
obvious to him that Mr. Barker could not pay the full amount. The Judge in his 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law found that Mr. Barker was unable to pay. 
The attorneys for the plaintiff would not stipulate to that. That written record meets 
the requirements of U.C.A., 78-27-1 and is evidence that Mr. Barker is not an 
absconding debtor. The lower court was told about this but refused to consider it. 
The Appellate Court should, in the interest of justice, require that this along with 
other matters mentioned in Point VI above be reconsidered in determining that Mr. 
Barker is not an absconding debtor. 
Ordinarily, the trial court has considerable discretion in adjusting the financial 
interests of divorced parties and, thus the court's: 
"actions are entitled to a presumption of validity." Hansen v. Hansen, 736 
P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah Ct.App. 1987). 
However, where the court has abused its discretion hi apportioning those 
financial responsibilities, the determination cannot be affirmed. See also Ostler v. 
Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). One such abuse that has been 
recognized in the area of the law is the failure to enter specific, detailed findings 
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supporting each of the factors which must be considered when making a child support 
award Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958-59 (Utah Ct. App.1988): Jefferies v. 
Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1988). The court failed to make specific findings in 
arriving at its' conclusion. 
Since the element of fraud, which was perpetrated by Appellee, as mentioned in 
Point X and Point XII above, does in fact exist, Mr. Barker should not be held liable 
for the full extent of Appellee's contract. 
POINT XIII 
STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
SERVICES GUILTY OF FALSIFYING COURT RECORD 
The State of Utah Department of Human Services, Office of Recovery Services 
is quilty of "stuffing'1 the official record with documents. 
After appellant discovered in the lower court clerk's office fifteen minutes 
before the beginning of the instant 1993 matter he made it a matter of record in the 
court. However, the documents were, upon his later examination, after the trial 
removed from the record. There was not time to review said documents since the clerk 
had to present the record to the judge. Appellant hereby reserves the right to review 
the record in light of documents having been added and then taken away from the 
record without any notification having been given to him. It is apparent that the lower 
court has degraded to allowing illegal action circumventing due process of law. 
POINT XIV 
TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY ADJUDICATED 
MATTERS NOT BEFORE IT WITHOUT FACTS OF 
LAW 
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The lower court in it's Judgment and Order dated 30 June 1993 paragraph 4 
stated that all previous orders be upheld is error. The Department of Social Services 
action to collect alleged prior monies owing, contained in Order in Supplemental 
Proceedings in this instant matter with the Utah Department of Human Services was, 
in the hearing of the lower court withdrawn by attorney Graf. Said Order was dated 
3 August 1992 but was not served until 8 February 1993, well beyond the 120 days 
allowed for timely service. Therefore pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
4 (b), that specific matter is to be dismissed without prejudice, and therefore the lower 
court is precluded from adjudicating that matter. 
However, since the court has ruled on the matters Appellant has included those 
matters relating to the Utah Department of Social Services elsewhere hi this brief. 
POINT XV 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE SPECIFIC DETAILED 
FINDINGS TO ARRIVE AT THE CONCLUSION THAT 
MR. BARKER IS NOT A SOVEREIGN 
Mr. Barker has no contract, agreement, license, or other nexus with the United 
States of America that would place him within the Jurisdiction of a legislative tribunal 
as authorized by United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17. Mr. 
Barker does not use a federal or state social security number or other number nor is he 
involved in any transactions involving federal debt. Mr. Barker is not a United States 
Constitution, 14th Amendment citizen. 
The lower court did not make specific detailed findings as to why it arrived at 
the conclusion that it had jurisdiction over the person Mr. Barker. Mr. Barker 
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maintains that the lower court has no jurisdiction over his person. 
POINT XVI 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE'S ATTORNEYS VIOLATED 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 11 
Appellee's Action did and does not have personal jurisdiction and said action is 
an abuse of process under color of law; and is fraudulent by the clairas and acts of the 
Appellee. 
The Attorneys of Record for the Appellee did not and has not investigated the 
facts, or proved the facts of this case to this court(s) on questions of Jurisdiction over 
the Appellant. 
Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11 the Attorneys of Record for the 
Plaintiffs did not and has not conducted a reasonable inquiry into the applicable law 
and the facts of the case* Plaintiffs Attorneys of Record have not or have refused to 
continue in the investigation and inquiry into the truthfulness of the case as told to 
him/her by his client. 
"The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the 
signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that 
to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after 
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing 
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal 
of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, 
such as to harass, or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in 
the cost of litigation." Nakash v United States Dept of Justice (1988, SD 
NY) 708 FSupp 1354, 
Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11 the signature of an attorney is 
certificate to the court that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other papers; 
that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after 
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reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact.... This has not occurred! The 
requirement of Rule 11: 
"merely adds an ethical responsibility to the conception that a claim that 
is baseless should not survive*" Levy v Seation 358 F Supp 1. 
The courts have held or recognized that one purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to 
streamline the litigation process by discouraging the attorney from signing dilatory or 
abusive tactics, such as the filing of frivolous claims or defenses or the use of pleading 
to harass or delay. Golden Eagle Distributing Corp, v Burroughs Corp. (1986 CA9 Cal) 
801 F2d 1531; Greenberg v Sala (1987), CA9 Nev, 822 F2d 882; Hurd v Ralphs Grocery 
Co (1987, CA9 CAL) 824 F2d 882: Hudson v Moore Business Forms (1987 CA9 CAL) 
827 F2d 450. 
The standard for imposing sanction under Rule 11 is an objective determination 
whether a sanctioned party's conduct was reasonable under the circumstances, 
explained the court in Brown v Fereation of States Medical Bds. (1987 CA7 111) 830 F2d 
1429; stating that subjective bad faith is no longer the crucial inquiry. Noting that Rule 
11 contains two grounds for sanctions, the first grounds is the "frivolous clause" and is 
composed of two subparts; 1) whether the party of attorney made a reasonable inquiry 
into the facts, and 2) whether the attorney made a reasonable inquiry into the law. The 
court held that a violation of either subpart of the frivolous clause constitutes a violation 
of Rule 11. 
To determine whether an attorney made a reasonable inquiry into the facts of a 
case, the courts have said that the court consider; 1) whether the signer of the 
documents had sufficient time for investigation; 2) the extent to which the attorney had 
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to rely on his/her client for the factual foundation underlying the pleading, motion, or 
other paper; 3) the complexity of the facts and attorney's ability to do a sufficient 
prefiling investigation; and 4) whether discovery would have been beneficial to the 
development of the underlying facts. 
The other prong of Rule 11, the "improper purpose clause'1, provides that a 
motion, pleading, or other document may not be interposed for the purposes of delay, 
harassment, or increase of cost of litigation, It should be noted that subjective bad faith 
is relevant in situations involving malicious prosecution of claims, although not in 
situations where a party has repeatedly pursued implausible claims. 
The Plaintiffs attorneys have violated Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11 
in trying to confuse this case with unfounded facts, escalate the cost of defending this 
action beyond Appellant's ability to pay for his defense, to clog the court docket and 
pervert justice; as evidenced on the record by the action of the Appellate Court's own 
Motion for Summary Disposition. The Appellate Court and the assistant attorney 
general of record have harassed Appellant through malicious process inasmuch as the 
Appellate Court did on its motion seek to have a summary disposition of this case on 
the basis of no new Notice of Appeal having been filed by Appellant after post Judgment 
and Orders. The facts prove otherwise. All parties were noticed and a certification to 
that effect was also served upon all parties, including the Appellate Court. Appellees 
action caused an escalation of court cost and time, loss of income and was frivolous, 
malicious process and harmed Mr. Barker. 
The Plaintiffs Attorneys of Record knew or should have known that there were 
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no jobs, of a like nature, in the area and that other mining work opportunities did in 
fact not exist and that Appellant was involuntarily unemployed- That Appellant has 
made a good faith effort to support his dependents (all of them) and has not 
intentionally avoided child support payments* 
The Attorneys of Record knew or should have known that Utah State Statutes 
CONFLICTS WITH OTHER STATE STATUTES and Utah State Constitution as it 
relates to the rights of Appellant. The trial court also was aware or should have been 
aware of these conflicting statutes, yet arbitrarily used those statutes that favor Appellee 
over Appellant; while totally ignoring those statutes which might favor Appellant's 
position • 
The Attorneys of Record knew or should have known THE EXACT 
STATUTORY PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING AND EXERCISING SUBJECT 
MATTER JURISDICTION under Utah Statutes instead attempting to "grandfather" 
Appellant into new statutes designed to enhance and benefit Appellee to the harm of 
Appellant, yet, again, arbitrarily picked and chose those statutes and law that favored 
Appellee over AppeDant; without giving the trial court the "full" statutory overview. 
The Plaintiffs Attorneys of Record knew or should have known the instant 
action was "STATUTE SHOPPING" FOR FINANCIAL GAIN in favor of Plaintiffs and 
Appellee Laura McGillivray to the detriment and exclusion of Appellant's second family 
of seven dependents. This is a blatant attempt by the State of Utah to establish, set and 
continue legal precedence in favor of the Appellee (female/mother) over the legal rights 
of the Appellant (male/father). It is a nation wide trial court trend found in many states 
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to attempt to eliminate and shove to the background the rights of the "other non welfare 
family" to give precedent and privilege to "welfare families". It has been very successful 
in such feminist welfare states as Wisconsin, Nevada, and Oregon, This is clear 
discrimination against an entire class of children (non-welfare) and families. There can 
be only one logical but unexpressed private agenda for this course; to promote the 
bureaucratic mushrooming of the Department(s) of Human Services (nation wide as well 
as Utah) turning them into a growth industry at the expense of the taxpayers and 
destroying male/fathers lives and raping their financial abilities even to support the non-
welfare families. 
This situation has resulted in senseless and needless court litigation in the 
Appellate Court resulting in unreasonable increases in litigation cost. 
The lower court found erroneously that the Appellee, Laura McGillivray was pro 
se. The facts on the record prove otherwise. The assistant attorney general Graf did 
plead for appellee, matters pertaining to personal property disposition which were found 
to be res judicata by the judge. Mr. Barker was denied equal protection under the law 
and was not even afforded counsel when demanded. Appellee had the benefit of legal 
counsel beyond the legal bounds set by statute. An attempt was made by the Asst. 
Attorney General near the conclusion of the proceeding to say that appellee Laura 
McGillivray was pro se but the record proves otherwise. 
The actions of the Attorneys of Record have inflicted financial devastation, severe 
physical, psychological, and emotional distress on Appellant and his family. It is 
currently and will continue to increase the cost of litigation, further complicating the 
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legal process. The Attorneys of Record for the Plaintiffs knew or should have known 
this fact. 
This court under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11 has inherent power to 
impose monetary sanctions on Appellees's legal counsel, contempt of court; award 
Appellant costs, and damages and to vacate/dismiss the trial court action. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
WHEREFORE APPELLANT PRAYS FOR RELIEF against the Appellee's and 
the Attorneys of Record as follows: 
1. To estop the Utah Department of Social Services and the Department of Human 
Services action by vacating and voiding it as being fraudulent and in want of personal 
jurisdiction since Appellant is not a United States Constitution, 14th Amendment citizen; 
2. To reverse judgment against said Departments since Appellant is not an 
absconding debtor, and to cause said Departments to pay Mr. Barker damages and 
punitive damages for loss of good name, severe physical and psychological stress for 
denying his support substance to his family and alienation of affections of his children 
and for necessary court costs and legal expenses, and loss of farm income from having 
to defend, in the amount of 100,000 dollars; 
3. To hold Appellant to be free of subrogation of Appellee's fraudulently entered 
Utah welfare contract which resulted in debt and insolvency and other harm to 
Apppellant; 
4. For sanctions against the Attorneys of Record for damages and, punitive 
damages, as a result of loss of farm income and legal expenses incurred defending 
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against: (A) A Motion for Summary Disposition which was frivolous and which 
increased litigation cost and otherwise delayed and harassed Mr. Barker and, (B) Other 
matters falsely claiming Mr. Barkor i:- K
 :>.r absconding debtor and rntcMtioaalty 
avoiding child support resulting in a loss of good name, severe physical and 
psychological dirfrcs-. . -y '\:ILC: viv. iU</>\>*-' odditis *:.am;i£e,s m iLe amount of 
800,000 dollars; 
I 'o reverse judgment of the lower court and allow for a material change of 
circumstances, and to declare him not an absconding debtor; 
6, To find U.C.A., 78-45-7.2 (5), 78-45-7.5 (5) (c), and 78-45-7.5 (7) (a) and (b) 
unconstitutional; 
That the Court for extra ordinary cause shown i.e., Appellant has been unable 
';• •<E;taim a cor;y ul-'^ he lnuF-;erifk. ny <na\ tucatEs nvnci^ -i m >M.tu m preparation of this 
brief due to his poverty, should invoke Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 2 in the 
interest of justice and should review the transcript, which is on file with the Appellate 
Court, to substantiate the facts of the arguments above; 
8, For court costs and legal expenses and such other and further relief that the 
court deems proper on thevr innnises. 
Dated this 5^_ day of April, 1994. Signed V ^ ' X ^ f X ~#~^~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Michael R. Barker, certify that 8 copies, 4 copies, and 2 copies of Appellant's 
Brief were mailed respectfully, postage prepaid, to: Utah Court of Appeals 400 
Midtown Plaza 230 S. 500 E. Suite 400 Salt Lake City, Utah, Utah Attorney General 
C/O Paul Graf # 1229, 201 E. 500 N. Richfield, Utah, 84701, and Laura McGillivray 
P. O. Box 4263 Wales, Utah (her last known address) on the gL day of April 1993. 
Signed ^i^C^KA &*J^ 
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